Currency Controls

Fatca & OECD CRS & CARF

FATCA, CRS & CARF Explained: Who Reports What

A plain-English guide to FATCA, the OECD Common Reporting Standard (CRS) and the new Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF): who reports, what is shared, when.

FATCA & OECD CRS non-reporting countries as of 2026

Countries with an excellent or good banking infrastructure that do not report to FATCA or OECD CRS

  1. Comoros
  2. Botswana
  3. Guatemala
  4. North Macedonia

Other Non-Participants in both FATCA and OECD CRS:

  1. Benin 
  2. Bosnia and Herzegovina
  3. Burkina Faso
  4. Chad
  5. Congo, Republic of the
  6. Côte d’Ivoire
  7. Democratic Republic of the Congo
  8. Djibouti
  9. Egypt
  10. El Salvador
  11. Eswatini
  12. Gabon
  13. Guinea
  14. Lesotho
  15. Liberia
  16. Madagascar
  17. Mali
  18. Mauritania
  19. Namibia
  20. Nepal
  21. Niger
  22. Palau
  23. Sierra Leone
  24. Sri Lanka
  25. Tanzania
  26. Togo
  27. Zimbabwe

Notable Absences:

The United States does not participate in the OECD CRS; it relies on FATCA instead.

OECD also lists these 42 jurisdictions as developing countries not yet asked to commit and without a first CRS exchange date: 

  1. Algeria, 
  2. Angola, 
  3. Belarus, 
  4. Benin, 
  5. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
  6. Botswana, 
  7. Burkina Faso, 
  8. Cambodia, 
  9. Chad, 
  10. Congo, 
  11. Côte d’Ivoire, 
  12. DRC, 
  13. Djibouti, 
  14. Dominican Republic, 
  15. Egypt, 
  16. El Salvador, 
  17. Eswatini, 
  18. Gabon, 
  19. Guatemala, 
  20. Guinea, 
  21. Guyana, 
  22. Haiti, 
  23. Honduras, 
  24. Lesotho, 
  25. Liberia, 
  26. Madagascar, 
  27. Mali, 
  28. Mauritania, 
  29. Namibia, 
  30. Nepal, 
  31. Niger, 
  32. North Macedonia, 
  33. Palau, 
  34. Philippines, 
  35. Serbia, 
  36. Sierra Leone, 
  37. Sri Lanka, 
  38. Tanzania, 
  39. Togo, 
  40. Uzbekistan, 
  41. Viet Nam, 
  42. Zimbabwe. 

Definition used 

“Non-reporting” = no CRS first-exchange date by OECD and no FATCA IGA listed by U.S. Treasury. FATCA itself can still apply directly to FFIs even without an IGA. Treasury lists 113 FATCA IGA jurisdictions; OECD’s latest commitment table is dated 22 May 2026.  

OECD CRS 

Reporting deadlines under the OECD Common Reporting Standard (CRS) are set nationally – in Germany, for example, financial institutions report to the Federal Central Tax Office by 31 July – and tax authorities exchange the data for the previous calendar year by 30 September.

Significance of the OECD CRS

In the EU, the CRS is implemented through the Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC2). Financial institutions report the account holder’s identity and tax residence, account balances and gross income and sale proceeds, but not individual transactions. More than 100 jurisdictions exchange data under the CRS (OECD commitment table of 22 May 2026). The United States remains the significant absentee, operating FATCA instead. 


Major financial hubs and tax havens are involved, highlighting the legal aspect of holding foreign accounts without mandatory reporting for holding accounts abroad.

Corporate Accounts

The CRS distinguishes between different types of corporate accounts. For active non-financial entities, banks report the entity itself where it is resident in a reportable jurisdiction, but do not look through to its controlling persons; for passive entities, the controlling persons are reported as well. Misclassification can lead to incorrect information being exchanged.

USA and FATCA

The United States has opted out of the OECD CRS and instead enforces FATCA. American banks require a U.S. tax identification number to open accounts, and accounts held by U.S. entities are not covered by the CRS.

Future Implications

Proposals for minimum taxes on very large fortunes, such as the 2024 report by economist Gabriel Zucman for the Brazilian G20 presidency, rely on the information that CRS makes available. No EU wealth tax has been adopted.

Planning 

Reporting regimes tighten. They do not loosen. Structures that were adequate five years ago are frequently not adequate now, and the direction of travel is towards demonstrating the provenance of wealth rather than merely its existence. The response is lawful planning, undertaken in advance and documented. That means understanding where each asset is tax-resident, holding the evidence of source of funds before anyone asks for it, and reviewing holding structures against the rules as they will be, not as they were. It does not mean concealment. Nothing on this site should be read as advice to evade tax or to withhold information from a competent authority. IFB does not assist with either, and clients who ask us to will be declined.

Act early. Decisions taken under time pressure are usually the expensive ones.

OECD’s Crypto‑Asset Reporting Framework (CARF): 

The United States 

  • The United States has committed to CARF exchanges by 2028; domestically, brokers report digital-asset transactions on IRS Form 1099‑DA  .

Globally Relevant Jurisdictions with No CARF Commitment 

According to the Global Forum, the following seven jurisdictions identified as relevant had not committed to implementing CARF by 2027/28  : 

  •  Argentina
  •  Australia
  •  El Salvador
  •  India
  •  Panama
  •  Philippines
  •  Vietnam

Other jurisdictions that are not listed among the CARF commitments include smaller financial centres; check the latest Global Forum table before relying on any jurisdiction’s status.

Summary & Context 

  • 67 jurisdictions, including the United States, have committed to first CARF exchanges by 2027 or 2028.
  • Seven relevant jurisdictions, including Australia and India, had not committed.
  • A handful of smaller or less-regulated jurisdictions, often seen as privacy havens, also remain outside the CARF ambit—but are under increasing OECD and EU pressure to align.

What Lies Ahead? 

  • Most major economies, especially within the OECD and EU, are implementing CARF by 2026–2027, with EU adoption internalised as DAC8 in force since 1 Jan 2026  .
  • Remaining non-participants will likely face regulatory pressure, blacklisting risk, or the need to adopt CARF in order to maintain access to global banking and financial systems.

Common Reporting Standard (CRS), Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) and the Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF): 

Instruments of Global Financial Transparency 

 
In little more than a decade, the international financial order has been fundamentally reshaped by the advent of comprehensive transparency regimes. These frameworks have been designed to dismantle the culture of opacity that once defined cross-border finance, to disarm the mechanisms of tax evasion, and to impose upon both institutions and individuals an unprecedented paradigm of accountability. At the heart of this transformation lie three instruments of singular importance: the Common Reporting Standard (CRS), the Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI), and the newly created Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF). 
 
The CRS, introduced by the OECD in 2014, represents the foundational template for the systematic collection and exchange of tax-relevant financial information. By obliging banks and custodians to identify their clients’ tax residencies and to report balances, investment income and proceeds from financial transactions, it has rendered the concealment of offshore wealth ever more difficult. More than one hundred jurisdictions now participate, creating a near-universal web of transparency. Yet the burdens are substantial: smaller institutions struggle under the weight of compliance costs, enforcement remains uneven, and the centralisation of sensitive financial data inevitably raises the spectre of misuse and cyber vulnerability. 
 
The AEOI may be seen as the operational architecture through which CRS is animated. It institutionalises the automatic, annual exchange of vast quantities of financial data between jurisdictions, displacing the older model of bilateral information requests. Its strengths are formidable: deterrence is sharpened, enforcement is globalised, and tax authorities obtain regular annual insight into their residents’ offshore holdings. Yet AEOI, too, carries limitations. Political reluctance in some jurisdictions impedes universal participation, discrepancies in data quality reduce efficacy, and the compliance burden upon institutions is immense. 
 
It is, however, in the domain of digital finance that the most striking regulatory evolution has occurred. The Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF), promulgated by the OECD in 2022, extends the architecture of financial transparency into the world of cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, tokenised assets and decentralised finance. By imposing reporting obligations upon exchanges, brokers and wallet providers, it seeks to prevent digital assets from becoming a sanctuary of anonymity beyond the reach of the tax authorities. In principle, CARF ensures that the revolution in transparency is not subverted by technological innovation. 
 
Yet the challenges here are greater still. The volatility of crypto valuations, the heterogeneity of token structures and the sheer pace of technological development render uniform reporting technically arduous. Jurisdictions that implement CARF aggressively may find their domestic institutions disadvantaged while others delay. And the integration of pseudonymous transactions into a regime of state surveillance raises pressing questions of privacy, proportionality and civil liberty. 
 
What unites these frameworks is not only their ambition to render financial holdings transparent, but also their inexorable trajectory towards ever deeper scrutiny. Under CRS and CARF alike, the mere disclosure of assets will not suffice indefinitely. The emerging direction of policy is clear: individuals and entities will in future be required to demonstrate not only what assets they possess, but also from whence those assets were derived. It will not be enough to state the existence of a balance or a portfolio; the origin of the funds, the economic activity that generated them, and the legitimacy of the profit will all be matters of record. This heralds a profound shift: the reporting regimes of tomorrow will fuse the domains of anti-money laundering, tax transparency and financial compliance into a single, comprehensive demand for the provenance of wealth. 
 
The advantages of such a trajectory are self-evident: the eradication of the last refuges of illicit capital, the strengthening of state revenues, and the restoration of fairness to the international tax system. Yet the drawbacks are equally apparent: compliance costs will escalate dramatically, the risk of intrusive overreach into legitimate privacy will intensify, and the possibility of stifling innovation or discouraging investment in heavily scrutinised jurisdictions must not be discounted. 
 
For financial institutions, the implications are decisive. Compliance infrastructures must be not only expanded but reimagined, integrating tax reporting, anti-money laundering and source-of-funds verification into a unified system of governance. Boards must treat transparency not as an ancillary regulatory obligation but as a core strategic function. Clients, meanwhile, will increasingly be compelled to reconcile themselves to a world in which their wealth is not merely disclosed but interrogated, its origin and growth subject to constant demonstration. 
 
The CRS, AEOI and CARF collectively inaugurate an era of radical visibility. The age of opacity is giving way to a regime in which financial actors must prove both the existence and the legitimacy of their wealth. The central challenge will be to ensure that this transparency serves the ends of justice, probity and stability, without extinguishing the essential values of privacy, innovation and economic freedom. In this balance lies the true test of the new financial order.